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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, ; 
Petitioner / Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
STATE OF UTAH ; 
Respondent / Appellee. ] 
) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
) CaseNo.20010367-SC 
ARGUMENT 
1. CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR. 
THOMAS HAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THIS APPEAL. 
The State argues that Mr. Thomas has inadequately briefed this appeal and that the 
claims should therefore be dismissed. Contrary to the State's contention, Mr. Thomas has 
followed the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in adequately briefing this appeal. 
The State contends that Appellant has not raised specific errors of the district court 
in his opening brief. That contention is incorrect. Each of the issues posed by Mr. 
Thomas in his opening brief specifically states the error of the district court. The 
following are a few specific examples of errors committed by the district court addressed 
by Appellant in his opening brief: (1) the district court improperly denied consideration of 
issues relating to or underlying the issue of jurisdiction on the ground that the issues were 
not raised in the original petition (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 1); (2) the 
district court improperly dismissed the instant petition on the ground that Appellant's 
challenge of an arrest warrant and information charging document were not properly 
raised (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 2); (3) the district court erred by 
declaring a lack of merit in Appellant's assertion that his bindover is invalid because it 
was done by a circuit court judge rather than a magistrate and subject matter jurisdiction 
is tainted by the lack of a valid bindover (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 3); 
(4) the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant (see 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Arguments 5 and 6); and (5) the district court prematurely 
dismissed the petition without holding a hearing for oral argument on the merits (see 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 11). Other errors relating to the above issues were 
also raised in Appellant's brief and the State's assertion otherwise is incorrect. 
The State also contends that Mr. Thomas has not cited to the record, a contention 
that is likewise incorrect. Mr. Thomas' brief specifically made reference to and even 
provided copies of the relevant portions of the record that were relied upon by Appellant 
to support his arguments. Therefore, by citing to the relevant portions of the record and 
providing copies of the same, Appellant has complied with the briefing rule. 
The State also contends Mr. Thomas has not provided meaningful legal analysis 
and simply repeats his arguments made below, but the contention is misguided. The 
arguments made by Mr. Thomas provide the requisite legal analysis for the Supreme 
Court to make an informed ruling on Mr. Thomas' petition, regardless of whether they 
were also made below. If the State is arguing that Appellant's form of argument is 
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inadequate, Appellant notes the State has itself used the same form of posing a question 
directed to where the district court erred, followed by an answer to that question and 
reasons for supporting the answer, as Appellant has done in the instant case. (See sample 
of prior State Brief in Addendum H, at page 2 thereof). The State, in requesting dismissal 
for inadequate briefing, is again attempting to reduce this entire matter to a technicality, 
as it tried to do in its Motion to Summarily Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, which this 
Court properly denied in its Order dated September 18, 2001. 
Any lack of development of the issues would, arguably, seem to pertain to the 
constitutionality of the Board's arrest warrant, and any such deficiencies, if any, are cured 
by this responsive pleading. Appellant respectfully requests that his claims and 
arguments contained in his opening brief and supplemented responsively herein be 
considered by the Court on their merits. 
2. CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR. 
THOMAS PROPERLY APPEALED THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT AND MR. THOMAS' ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED ON 
APPEAL OR WAIVED. 
As stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. Thomas properly raised and preserved 
the issues for appeal by filing more than six (6) years ago the instant petition, which is not 
a post-conviction petition. Rather, the petition was filed as a pre-conviction petition under 
former Utah R. Civ. P. rule 65B(b) and (e) (a copy of which is attached herein as 
Addendum I), having no plain, speedy remedy. Because Mr. Thomas filed the petition 
pro se, the Court should liberally interpret the nature of Mr. Thomas' petition, consistent 
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with the liberal pleading practices and procedures of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Robert E. Wilcox, Liquidator of Southern American Insurance Co. v. Geneva Rock 
Corporation, 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). This Court has "reiterated that 'the fundamental 
purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.'9' Id. (Quoting 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)). In addition to the 
liberal interpretation to which pro se papers are entitled, Appellant notes further that 
unadjudicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.1 The district court 
therefore committed plain error by holding, in part, that the issues relating to subject 
matter jurisdiction may have been waived (see pages 2-3 in Memorandum Decision of 
February 22,2001 in addendum A of Appellant's Opening Brief). Further, Mr. Thomas' 
issues have not been seriously addressed until now, though the district court itself 
purported to permit these issues, by its Order of August 31, 2000 (see Addendum F in 
Appellant's Opening Brief). Still further, the untreated issues that have yet to be 
meaningfully adjudicated have not been deliberately waived by Mr. Thomas, and must 
therefore now be adjudicated. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1980). 
Liberally interpreting Mr. Thomas' pro se petition, there is enough factual evidence of 
record and in Mr. Thomas' addenda to support the instant appeal, and the issues raised in 
1
 See Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993); and James v. Galetka, 965 
P.2d 567; 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah App. 1998). The State appears to acknowledge that Mr. 
Thomas' issues may not have been previously adjudicated (see Brief of Appellee page 13) and 
the State fails to establish that they were adjudicated. 
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said petition. Notwithstanding the above, if the Court deems the issues raised on appeal 
not to have been properly raised below, Appellant respectfully requests the Court either 
deem them raised by Appellant's Opening Brief in combination with the original pro se 
petition, or remand for leave to file an amended petition. 
Even if it is found that Appellant's Opening Brief raises new issues that were not 
preserved below at the trial court level, there are exceptions to the rule that a defendant 
who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the 
first time on appeal, which rule Appellant acknowledges is supported in State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); and State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App. 1991). Three independent exceptions to this general rule are recognized in Utah. 
(1) An appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant 
establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau. 820 P.2d at 922; (2) if there are "exceptional 
circumstances," Id.; or (3) in some situations, if a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised on appeal even though, by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the 
matter was not raised during trial. See State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 
1991); State of Utah v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). 
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Thomas should have raised his 65B(b) issues at the 
trial court level or on appeal of his conviction, Mr. Thomas should not be held 
responsible for his indigent status which required him to use counsel that was clearly 
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ineffective in that case. Indeed, many of the issues of merit will never be heard unless 
this Court agrees to address such unadjudicated issues and allow Mr. Thomas the chance 
to have these issues finally heard, in contrast to the procedure that our system has 
perpetrated on Mr. Thomas. Therefore, even if it is found that an issue has been brought 
up on appeal for the first time, the ineffective assistance of Mr. Thomas' counsel at trial 
(explained below) should not bar him from having his claims heard, a due process 
imperative permitted by the third exception referred to above. 
The ineffective assistance of counsel exception applies in this case because the 
trial judge specifically declined to address the pre-conviction issues raised by this 
petition, and specifically instructed Appellant and his then counsel that Appellant may 
raise such issues on appeal. (See Addendum J, attached herein). Given such explicit 
instructions, coupled with the State's assertions that the issues raised here were not raised 
at trial or on appeal, the Court is requested to take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. 
Thomas' prior counsel's assistance is necessarily ineffective by counsel's failure to raise 
the unadjudicated issues brought up in this petition, and which the trial judge specifically 
instructed should be raised on appeal. 
Mr. Thomas even tried to consolidate the unadjudicated issues on direct appeal of 
his conviction with the Supreme Court, however, this Court declined to consolidate those 
issues and remanded the writ back to the district court for disposition. (See Addendum K, 
attached herein). Because the district court did not properly adjudicate all of the issues 
-6-
raised by this petition, and because those issues were not raised on appeal by Mr. 
Thomas' counsel, and because Mr. Thomas' later pro se effort to consolidate them with 
his appeal did not succeed, disposition of all said issues by this Court is sought. 
The State has attempted to characterize the instant petition as a post-conviction 
habeas corpus petition because the petition was heard after Mr. Thomas was convicted. 
Additionally, the district court treated the petition only as one for habeas corpus under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 65B(b) Wrongful Imprisonment, as it existed prior to 
the 1996 amendments,2 and not as a rule 65B(e) petition for Wrongful Use of Judicial 
Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty, as it was filed in part. Now, the State would 
like the Supreme Court to view the instant petition as either being barred by rule 65B(a) 
arguing Mr. Thomas had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available through the 
appeals process, or as moot. 
However, the State's characterization is incorrect. Mr. Thomas actually filed the 
petition and the subsequent amended petition under two subsections of rule 65B, namely 
65B(b) and 65B(e) (R. 00001-00006 and 00121-00127). Additionally, Mr. Thomas filed 
the instant petition February 7, 1995 and amended said petition on March 27,1995, more 
than five (5) months prior to his trial in August of 1995, where he was convicted, making 
this petition a pre-conviction petition and not a post-conviction petition as characterized 
2
 All references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B will be to the rules as they 
existed at the time of Mr. Thomas' filing of his petition in 1995, and thus the 1996 amendments, 
which incorporated 65B(b) into 65C, are inapplicable. 
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by the State. The issues presented in this timely filed and until now ignored pre-
conviction petition should be addressed because the bases for appellant's conviction are 
much different than the issues raised in appellant's rule 65B petition for pre-conviction 
extraordinary relief Accordingly, it is important that the Court avoid treating this matter 
as merely a petition for post-conviction relief confined to the issues raised at trial, as the 
principles of due process dictate that Mr. Thomas not be denied the chance to have the 
present issues heard. The fact that Mr. Thomas, after filing his petition, was tried and 
convicted in an entirely separate proceeding on the evidence proffered, does not 
extinguish his right to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction, wrongful imprisonment, 
and wrongful use of judicial authority, as the issues Appellant properly raised before trial 
by the petition have until now been substantially ignored. 
Even though the district court viewed the petition as though it had been filed under 
rule 65B(b) for post-conviction relief in the nature of a writ for habeas corpus, the 
Supreme Court is not bound by the district court's characterization of the petition. Renn 
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). The Supreme Court should 
look to the substance of the action and nature of the instant, pro se, petition to ascertain 
the relief sought in determining the true nature of the extraordinary relief requested by 
Mr. Thomas. Id. Thus, as the Court stated in Renn. "the name a party or a court applies 
to an action for an extraordinary writ is not binding if the true nature of the petition is 
other than the name applied to it." Id. Therefore, the Court should view this petition as 
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one not only for wrongful imprisonment, but also as one for wrongful use of judicial 
authority or failure to comply with duty under rule 65B(e) and as a challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Similar to Renn, Mr. Thomas also challenges the Board's decisions and authority 
to issue an arrest warrant3 from which the State ultimately claims to have lawfully held 
Mr. Thomas for the offense for which he was convicted. Mr. Thomas' rule 65B(e) 
petition is the proper petition for challenging the Board's decisions and authority, 
according to Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole and State of Utah, 947 P.2d 664, 
667 (Utah 1997). Therefore, because the State claims to derive its detainment and arrest 
of Mr. Thomas as being based on the arrest warrant of the Board, due process requires 
Mr. Thomas be permitted to challenge the Board's decisions and authority to arrest him as 
well as the State's subsequent claim to have lawfully detained Mr. Thomas. The Board's 
actions, coupled with the other state constitutional and statutory violations committed by 
the State, as argued in Appellant's Opening Brief and in Mr. Thomas' pro se petition, 
should therefore be reviewed on the merits, and Mr. Thomas should be released. 
3. CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN RELIANCE ON THE ACTIONS OF THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE. 
A. This Petition is the Only Procedural Mechanism Available for Challenging 
the Board. 
3
 See Addendum G in Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief. 
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The decision of the Board concerning paroles, pardons, commutations or 
terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are deemed by 
the statute to be "final and are not subject to judicial review," pursuant to UCA 77-27-
5(3). The State itself asserts that the Board's actions cannot be reviewed by the trial 
court. (See Brief of Appellee pages 28-29). Therefore, because the legislature has 
provided no mechanism for direct appeal from the Board of Pardons' actions, an 
extraordinary petition under rule 65B(e) is an appropriate remedy to challenge the 
Board's decisions and authority, Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole and State of 
Utah, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997), and it is therefore not possible for Mr. Thomas to 
have waived his right to challenge the Board's action. Mr. Thomas' rule 65B(e) petition 
is proper in this case because the arrest warrant issued by the Board dealt with conditions 
or violations of Mr. Thomas' parole, which issues are not subject to judicial review. 
Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 512; 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1994). Therefore, 
those issues that are interconnected with the arrest warrant issued by the Board, may not 
be properly resolved without reference to the Board's arrest warrant because the decision 
of the Board is what the State ultimately relies upon for its authority to hold and detain 
Mr. Thomas. All of the violations by the State after that detainment are, therefore, 
interconnected with said Board's invalid arrest warrant and are thereby tainted from it, 
and since there is no judicial review of the Board's actions there can be no complete 
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review of the circumstances present in this case except by way of this extraordinary 
petition. 
The right to challenge the Board of Pardons is provided under the very rule this 
petition was filed under, rule 65B(e), according to this Court. Padilla v. Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997). In contrast, the rule 65B(b) writ of 
habeas corpus is available only to petitioners challenging the legality of his or her 
detention, the lawfulness of the court imposed sentence, or the conditions of his or her 
imprisonment. Id. In Padilla, the plaintiff challenged the Board's actions under rule 
65B(b), (c) and (e), alleging that the Board denied him of his due process rights. Because 
the challenges did not involve the legality of his detention, the conditions of his 
imprisonment or a court-imposed sentence, the writ of habeas corpus under 65B(b) was 
not available. Instead, the plaintiffs claims in Padilla challenging the Board's actions 
were reviewable only under rule 65B(e). 
In the instant case, Mr. Thomas filed a 65B petition under subsections (b) and (e) 
claiming a lack of jurisdiction by the Board and the court commissioner. In order to come 
under the scope of 65B(b) a habeas corpus petition must challenge a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense, and matters challenging anything other than a conviction 
or sentence for a criminal offense and actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole 
will not come under the scope of 65B(b). In the present case, Mr. Thomas challenges the 
jurisdiction of the court commissioner and the Board of Pardons and Parole in issuing 
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their respective arrest warrants as well as other matters included in his petition. 
Therefore, Mr. Thomas correctly used, as one of his bases for relief, rule 65B(e) for 
challenging the Board of Pardons and Parole as supported by Padilla. 
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the arrest warrant4 issued by the court 
commissioner six (6) days after Mr. Thomas' arrest was invalid because the court 
commissioner lacked the requisite judicial authority. State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 303 
(Utah 1998). Likewise, the charging information, executed by the same court 
commissioner who executed the invalid search warrant and invalid arrest warrant, is also 
invalid because said court commissioner had no judicial authority to execute such a 
document. The charging information also lacked basis by its reliance on an 
uncorroborated confession by Mr. Thomas.5 Further, the State has failed to disprove the 
fact that the court commissioner only has misdemeanor jurisdiction, and since the county 
prosecutor failed to enter a new, corrected charging document curing the error of the 
prosecution's failure to have the charging document entered by a magistrate judge as 
required by law, jurisdiction is wholly lacking. Therefore, the prosecution should have 
issued a corrected arrest warrant but they failed to do so. 
The State argues the above facts are moot because they already had the outstanding 
arrest warrant issued by the Board for Mr. Thomas, and that warrant entitled the State to 
4
 See Addendum G in Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief. 
5
 See pages 1-2 of the Information in Addendum G of Petitioner / Appellant's Opening 
Brief. 
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charge Mr. Thomas with the underlying robbery even though Mr. Thomas' arrest and 
detention were originally deemed warrantless, as indicated by the prosecution's efforts to 
obtain the invalid court commissioner arrest warrant and an invalid charging document 
six (6) days later. However, there should be no separation of the events that led to the 
arrest of Mr. Thomas and the totality of the circumstances should be viewed in 
conjunction with, and not separate from, the invalid arrest warrant issued by the Board. 
In so doing, it may be concluded that the court commissioner lacked the judicial authority 
to issue an arrest warrant and a proper charging document, and that the Board similarly 
lacked the requisite judicial authority to issue an arrest warrant, and that the State 
therefore held Mr. Thomas unlawfully and failed to hold a probable cause hearing for the 
robbery within forty-eight (48) hours of the arrest as required by law. 
B. The Board Lacks the Appropriate Judicial Authority to Issue an Arrest 
Warrant. 
Mr. Thomas challenges UCA 77-27-11(3) as a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine, as the Board of Pardons and Parole lacks the appropriate judicial 
authority to issue an arrest warrant. The Utah Supreme Court employs an analytical 
model when the constitutionality of a statute is attacked on the basis of the separation of 
powers doctrine. Article V, section 1, of the Utah State Constitution contains the 
separation of powers provision, which reads: 
[i] The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and [ii] no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
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to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
The analytical model has a three part analysis: (1) are those in question "charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to" one of the three branches of 
government? (2) Is the function that the statute has given those in question one 
"appertaining to" another branch of government? (3) Last, if the answer to both of the 
above two questions is "yes" then does the constitution "expressly direct or permit" 
exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If not, then article V section 1 is 
transgressed. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable David S. Young, District 
Judge. 976 P.2d 581, 584; 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1999). 
The Board of Pardons and Parole is not a judicial branch nor is it made up of 
judges, but is merely an administrative agency and a part of the executive branch of 
government, according to article VII, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. Article 
VII relates to the executive branch of the government and section 12 reads in part: 
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall 
appoint the members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms 
of office shall be as provided by statute. 
(2) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other 
conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures, 
and restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons after 
convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to 
regulations as provided by statute. 
Therefore, the Board has been created by the Utah State Constitution as a part of the 
executive branch and its authority to act is enumerated in subsection (2) above and does 
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not include core judicial functions. Even the State's brief admits that the Board is not a 
part of the judicial branch (See Brief of Appellee page 24), and other state departments 
recognize the same. (See Addendum L, attached herein). 
Proceeding with the separation of powers analysis laid out by the Supreme Court, 
the first inquiry is whether the Board is "charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to" one of the three branches of government. The answer to this question is 
"yes." According to the Utah State Constitution, the Board has been given executive 
authority to grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures, and restitution orders, commute 
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, all of which are executive powers. 
Therefore, the Board is charged with powers properly belonging to the executive branch. 
Secondly, and most importantly, is the function that the statute has given the 
Board one "appertaining to" another branch of government? The answer to this question 
is "yes." The statute in question, UCA 77-27-11(3), reads in part: 
Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified 
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, 
detain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or 
otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is 
probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his 
parole. 
In determining whether the power enumerated in the statute belongs to another branch of 
government, other than the executive branch, the case of State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 
303 (Utah 1998), is insightful. The Supreme Court in that case relied on its decision in 
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Ohms6 and determined that core judicial functions include: (1) the power to hear and 
determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation, (2) the 
authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies, (3) the authority to enforce 
any valid judgment, decree or order, and (4) all powers that are necessary to protect the 
fundamental integrity of the judicial branch (emphasis added). In Thomas, the Supreme 
Court definitively concluded that a search warrant is an order and that issuance of such a 
warrant is a core judicial function. Using like reasoning as the Supreme Court in 
Thomas, an arrest warrant is also a core judicial function because it is also an order, an 
order to seize a person and deprive that person of his/her liberty. Although there is no 
definition of an arrest warrant in the Utah Code as there is for a search warrant, an arrest 
warrant is a deprivation of a person's liberty. The word "warrant" itself, as defined in a 
standard dictionary, is "An order that serves as authorization, especially: (a) A voucher 
authorizing payment or receipt of money; or (b) Law, A judicial writ authorizing an 
officer to make a search, seizure, or arrest or to execute a judgment." When a judge 
issues to law enforcement an order to seize an individual, the judge simultaneously 
exercises the power and authority to enforce such an order, because once armed with an 
issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to deprive a person of his/her liberty. Thus, 
because an arrest warrant is an order, similar to a search warrant, and the issuer claims the 
authority to enforce the order, the issuance of an arrest warrant should be considered a 
6Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994). 
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core judicial function. See State v. Thomas. Therefore, when the Board issues a warrant 
pursuant to UCA 11-21A 1(3), it exercises judicial authority, which power appertains to 
another branch of government beside the executive branch, of which the Board is a part. 
Third, and lastly, since the answer to both of the above two questions is "yes," we 
must ask: does the constitution "expressly direct or permit exercise of the otherwise 
forbidden function?" The answer to this question is "no," and article V section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution is transgressed. The Utah Constitution does not expressly direct or 
permit exercise of the warrant function that the statute authorizes, and therefore, article V, 
section 1 is transgressed and UCA 77-27-11(3) should be struck down as 
unconstitutional, and the same is respectfully requested. 
C. The Board Lacks the Ultimate Judicial Power to Revoke Its Own 
Agreement. 
Unadjudicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be 
brought up at any stage of a proceeding.7 Mr. Thomas challenges the Board's power to 
revoke his parole as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the authority 
delegated to the Board involves a core judicial function which an administrative agency 
cannot perform. Therefore, the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. 
Thomas' parole revocation case. The "judicial power of courts" is understood to mean 
the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in 
litigation. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849. In the instant case, the Board, as an 
7
 See Barnard v. Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243,248 (Utah 1993). 
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administrative agency, does not have the judicial power of courts to hear and determine 
the outcome of a parole revocation proceeding because such a hearing on the merits is a 
core judicial function. 
As stated above, this Court has determined that core judicial functions include: (1) 
the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and 
questions in litigation, (2) the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies, 
(3) the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order, and (4) all powers that 
are necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch (emphasis 
added).8 In this case, Mr. Thomas and the Board are adverse parties because the parole 
agreement, between Mr. Thomas and the Board, is an enforceable contract. The Board 
does not have the judicial authority to adjudicate, let alone the authority to adjudicate its 
own contract and then enforce it by issuing an invalid arrest warrant depriving Appellant 
of his due process rights by unlawfully detaining him. If otherwise allowed, the Board's 
power would be akin to having two parties to a contract, one of which unilaterally 
determines that a breach has occurred and then enforces their will on the other party, not 
by enforcing the contract in court on the merits (as is appropriate), but by unilaterally 
dictating its own remedy. That is exactly what the Board has done in this case. 
According to the Board's rule, R671-507(1), which was in effect during the 
relevant time period, and the parole agreement (see Addendum M, attached herein), the 
8
 See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah 1998). 
-18-
Board may take action against a parolee only upon a violation of the parole agreement or 
upon a conviction for a new crime. In either case, Mr. Thomas had the right to have his 
parole revocation case heard by a judge, pursuant to this Court's rulings cited above, and 
because the Board does not have the judicial authority to enforce or hear the controversy 
to which it is a party, as that is a core judicial function only a magistrate judge can 
perform. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 852. Therefore, an individual, other than a 
duly appointed judge, who wields such judicial power as the Board's action in this case is 
a violation of the separation of powers. Id Dismissal of this issue was improper. 
4. CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE 
MERITS BECAUSE, AS ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER VESTED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN 
APPELLANT. 
The district court below on August 31, 2000, entered an Order to vacate a minute 
entry pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). (See Addendum F in Appellant's Opening Brief). 
The district court directed the State to respond to both the petition and amended petition 
filed by Mr. Thomas, pro se. According to item 6 of the Order, the issues of the petition 
include: 
those raised in the original petition of February 7, 1995, and the amended 
petition of March 27, 1995. This [sic] issues shall be confined generally to 
the issue of jurisdiction, the validity of the search warrant, arrest warrant 
and the Information charging document, the issue of whether a proper 
probable cause determination was made, the issue concerning the board 
warrant, and any other issue raised in said original petition of February 7, 
1995, or said amended petition of March 27, 1995. 
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Therefore, in its decision to vacate the minute entry, the district court acknowledged the 
issues presented by the instant petition. Thus, the fact that the district court ordered the 
petition to move forward on those issues is a recognition that the petition did in fact 
present those issues and possibly other issues not enumerated therein. 
Besides recognizing the issues presented by the pro se petition, the August 31, 
2000 Order vacating the minute entry also recognized the need for an oral hearing on the 
merits and in fact promised the same, but failed to allow one. The record below, 
particularly Appellant's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion Under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(b) to Vacate Minute Entry and Set Date for Evidentiary Hearing, or Notice of 
Time for Filing Notice of Appeal (R. 01813-01850), indicates the need for a hearing on 
the merits. Subsequent to the filing and granting of said motion and memorandum, the 
district court itself ordered, in item 5, the following: "At the appropriate time, the court 
shall schedule a hearing for oral argument." The district court thereby vested certain 
procedural rights in Mr. Thomas that it later violated, because no hearing on the merits 
was ever scheduled despite the need and Order guaranteeing one. 
Alternatively, even if there are no factual issues in dispute, the district court made 
several inconsistent statements that led to issues being metaphorically swept under the 
rug. As stated above, according to the Order of August 31, 2000, the district court 
recognized the issues as being presented by the petition (see item 6 of that Order, 
Addendum F in Appellant's Opening Brief), and ordered both parties to respond 
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appropriately. However, in its Memorandum Decision the district court contradicted its 
earlier Order stating that: "First, the Court notes that these issues (regarding the court 
commissioner's arrest warrant and charging information) were not properly raised in 
petitioner's Petition" (see Memorandum Decision pages 2-3, Addendum A in Appellant's 
Opening Brief) and then gave little more than lip service to the issue presented, stating 
there was a valid Board warrant already issued. This is an example of how the State has 
attempted to isolate the timing of the events, as argued above, and dispose of each issue 
one by one in isolation by referring to some other document or aspect of the case that is 
invalid, without considering the timing of the invalid documents together in a totality of 
the circumstances analysis. For example, the issuance of the Board's arrest warrant was 
dealt with by the district court in two different parts of its Memorandum Decision of 
February 22, 2001, and both parts were isolated from the other. The first part cited the 
pre-existing Board arrest warrant as one reason why the validity of the court 
commissioner's warrant is supposedly moot. The second part of the lower decision that 
addressed the Board-issued warrant is simply lip service, stating only: "The Court is of 
the opinion that the argument that the Board warrant was invalid is without merit."9 A 
hearing on the merits, as ordered, would have allowed the review this Court is now asked 
to make, concerning the relationship between the lack of judicial authority vested in the 
9
 See page 4 of the Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 2001, of Addendum A in 
Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief. 
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court commissioner as well as in the Board, and the invalid arrest warrants and other 
invalid documents. 
Assuming the Order of August 31, 2000 was not mere form over substance, said 
Order vested certain rights in Appellant, including the right to raise the issues specified in 
the Order as well as any others deemed to have been raised in Mr. Thomas' original rule 
65B petitions. After succeeding in having the petition reinstated by his motion below 
under rule 60(b), Mr. Thomas raised the issue of the adequacy of his petitions in his 
supporting pleading below10, and he had planned to raise these issues during the promised 
hearing that was never held. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas' issues have either been properly 
raised in his petitions, as recognized by the district court in its Order of August 31, 2000, 
or otherwise Mr. Thomas would have had a chance at the hearing to request leave for 
amending his timely-filed rule 65B petition, or Mr. Thomas should, alternatively, now 
have a chance to amend the petition since unadjudicated issues of subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived under the above authority. 
5. CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR. 
THOMAS WAS NOT IN THE LAWFUL CUSTODY OF THE STATE, THE 
TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION, AND THE LACK OF A 
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING WITHIN 48 HOURS OF ARREST SUPPORTS 
THE CONCLUSION THAT MR. THOMAS MUST NOW BE RELEASED. 
The State turns to the state of Wisconsin by citing the case of State v. Harris, 174 
Wis.2d 367, 375; 497 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. App. 1993), for the proposition that Mr. Thomas 
l0See (from lower court proceeding) Memorandum in Reply to Respondent's Response to 
Petition and Motion to Dismiss, and Request for Hearing Ordered by Court (R. 02038-02110). 
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was already in the state's lawful custody because he is a parolee, and that the requirement 
for a probable cause determination by a judicial officer within 48 hours is therefore 
inapplicable. The State fails to mention that the Harris case pertained not to a parolee but 
to an individual who was already incarcerated and had been captured and arrested while 
attempting to escape, a key fact absent in this case and which underlies the Harris court's 
determination that the 48-hour rule did not apply. Mr. Thomas was a parolee, not an 
escapee. As established by the U.S. Supreme Court, a parolee is not "in custody" merely 
because he is on parole,11 and the State's assertion to the contrary is therefore incorrect. 
Since Mr. Thomas was not arrested for an escape attempt, this case thereby lacks the type 
of facts upon which the entire Harris decision was based, and Harris clearly cannot be 
applied to waive Mr. Thomas' constitutional right to a probable cause determination by a 
judicial officer within 48 hours. A finding otherwise would fly in the face of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Morrissey decision. 
The law clearly states that an individual cannot be detained, without a probable 
cause determination by a judicial officer, for longer than 48 hours after an arrest without a 
valid warrant, and the rule cited by the U.S. Supreme Court, and Utah's own rules, 
1
 ^ orrissev et al. v. Brewer et aL 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
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indicate that releasing Mr. Thomas is a proper remedy under these circumstances.12 It is 
further noted that: 
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause 
determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the 
arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable 
delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the 
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. 
The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to 
consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary 
circumstance. 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). 
The State has failed to establish that Mr. Thomas' arrest included a valid warrant, 
or that the lack of a probable cause determination by a judicial officer within 48 hours 
was occasioned by a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Since no 
such determination was made in the two (2) years between Mr. Thomas' arrest and his 
trial, Appellant respectfully submits that the State cannot prove the existence of an 
emergency or extraordinary circumstance that could have postponed the required probable 
cause determination for so long. 
This Court has previously declared, in State v. Thomas, that the search warrant in 
this case was invalid because a court commissioner does not have the judicial authority to 
exercise such core judicial functions, such as issuance of a search warrant. If this Court 
12Utah R. J. Admin. § 4-611(1) (Petitioner, if arrested without a valid arrest warrant, 
cannot be held for longer than 48 hours if a probable cause determination by a judicial authority 
is not made within 48 hours of the arrest); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 81-83 (1994) (an 
arrested person be released if not brought before a magistrate within 72 hours). 
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additionally finds that the arrest warrant and the charging information document, both of 
which were signed by the same court commissioner who signed the invalid search 
warrant, were invalid for the same reasons, and if this Court further finds that the Board 
lacks the requisite judicial authority to issue an arrest warrant, then the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction and the State unlawfully held Mr. Thomas. Therefore, because the State held 
Mr. Thomas unlawfully and the State did not hold a probable cause hearing within 48 
hours of Mr. Thomas' arrest, the opportunity for the State to cure the above mentioned 
defects is barred by the statute of limitations, and Mr. Thomas should be released, or 
alternatively, Appellant should at the very least be retried. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant respectfully submits that the facts, points and arguments made herein are 
sufficient to state a claim for which relief can be granted, that the issues have been 
properly preserved and that the petition should be granted. Based upon the foregoing, 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the ruling of the lower court, declare 
UCA § 77-27-11(3) unconstitutional, and either order Appellant's release from 
incarceration, or remand for further proceedings consistent with the arguments herein, or 
provide other relief as this Court deems just. In the alternative, Appellant respectfully 
requests remand for leave to file an amended petition. 
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Respectfully submitted, and dated this day of December, 2001. 11 
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Addendum H 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 20000257-SC 
v. : 
ANNA MARIE MORGAN, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The State appeals the court of appeals' decision in State v. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 
48, 997 P.2d 910, cert granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000),. which reversed defendant's 
convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (1998), and possession of 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to its grant of certiorari review. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW 
Certiorari was granted to review Morgan's interpretation and application of State v. 
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), which held that due process guarantees limit the 
State's ability to refile an information previously dismissed for insufficient evidence unless 
the prosecutor "show[s] that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that 
other good cause justifies refiling." See Addenda A (Morgan) & B (Brickey). 
Specifically, was the court of appeals correct in effectively abolishing the "other good 
cause" prong of the Brickey test by imposing a rigid and unprecedented new requirement that 
"new or previously unavailable evidence" must always be presented in order to allow refiling 
of a criminal charge that has been previously dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness by applying the same standard of review applicable to that court. 
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ [10, 994 P.2d 1243. 
Whether due process precludes refiling in a particular case is a question of law, 
reviewed on appeal for correctness. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 at ^8. See also State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The trial court's underlying factual findings are 
accorded deference and rejected only for clear error. Morgan at ^ |8. 
Preservation Below: The State has consistently argued that refiling of the information 
was permissible in this case (Rl: 16-18; R2:23-25; PHI: 36-38; JuneHg: 2-9; Sept Hg: 15-
2 
njOctHg^^o).1 
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Determinative provisions, attached in Addendum C, include: 
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, sec. § 1; 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7; 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 22,1998, defendant was charged with second degree felony possession 
ofmethamphetamine with intent to distribute and misdemeanor possession of marijuana (Rl: 
1-3). 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 6,1998, before Magistrate Michael K. Burton 
(PH1). The magistrate initially ruled that the preliminary hearing evidence was sufficient to 
establish defendant's unlawful possession of both drugs, but was insufficient to establish 
defendant's intent to distribute the methamphetamine (PHI: 34-38). The prosecutor 
immediately moved to reopen the preliminary hearing to permit another officer to testify 
(PHI: 3, 38). The magistrate took the matter under advisement but eventually denied the 
1
 The record on appeal combines two district court records: Case No. 
981200247FS contains the original information and first preliminary hearing; Case No. 
981201030FS includes the refiled information, second preliminary hearing, and trial. In 
this brief, the pleading file in the first case is designated as Rl, the transcript of the first 
preliminary hearing as PHI, the second pleading file as R2, and the second preliminary 
hearing as PH2. Transcripts of motion hearings are referred to by month, all having 
occurred in 1998: June Hg, Sept. Hg & Oct. Hg. The trial transcript is designated by 
name. 
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Addendum I 
PREFACE 
This volume replaces the 1994 edition of the Utah Court Rules Annotated 
and its October 1994 Supplement. It contains state court rules, local federal 
court rules, and the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
This volume contains new and amended rules received as of January 31, 
1995, and notes to the following sources: 
Pacific Reporter, 2d Series, through 884 P.2d 644. 
Supreme Court Reporter, through 115 S. Ct. 536. 
Federal Reporter, 3d Series, through 38 F.3d 575. 
Federal Supplement, through 864 F. Supp. 174. 
Federal Rules Decisions, through 157 F.R.D. 554. 
Bankruptcy Reporter, through 173 Bankr. 822. 
This volume also contains annotations from decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals filed as of December 15, 1994. 
The annotations also include references to the Utah Law Review, the Brig-
ham Young University Law Review, Journal of Contemporary Law, Journal 
of Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Law, American Jurispru-
dence, Second Series (Am. Jur. 2d), American Law Reports, Third, Fourth, 
and Fifth Series (A.L.R.3d, 4th, and 5th) and Federal (A.L.R. Fed.), and Cor-
pus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.). These and other helpful notes and references 
have been reviewed, updated, and relocated where necessary. Cross-reference 
notes to statutory and judicial material of similar and/or related subject mat-
ter located elsewhere in the Code are provided. 
Acknowledgment is made to the courts in Utah and their administrative 
staffs for providing copies of various rules and their amendments and official 
comments. 
The Michie Company 
March 1995 
v 
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Fillmore City v Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
1977). 
Separate action. 
Subdivision (c) of this rule does not preclude 
a separate action on an injunction bond; 
rather, it allows an action on the bond to be 
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the 
option of the enjoined party. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Char-
tered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
Wrongfully issued injunction. 
If the restraining or enjomder is not wrong-
ful, the party enjoined has no basis for recovery 
on the bond; if, however, it is found that the 
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined 
party has an action for costs and damages in-
curred as a result of the wrongfully issued in-
junction. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1984). 
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an 
injunction bond Bhould be limited only to the 
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result 
of the wrongfully issued injunction. Beard v 
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct App. 1987). 
Showing by party sought to be enjoined. 
—Operation of nuisance. 
A defendant who wants to operate a plant 
which has been declared to be a nuisance is 
required to offer evidence to the court as to how 
the plant can be used without creating a nui-
sance before he can complain that the court did 
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper 
v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 
P.2d 360 (1952). 
Wrongful injunction. 
—Attorney's fees. 
When attorney's fees are incurred in defend-
ing against wiongfully obtained injunctive re-
lief and also against an underlying lawsuit, it 
is appropriate to determine the amount of the 
total fees attributable to resist mg the injunc. 
tion. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah 
Ct App. 1990), 
Under this rule, a party is entitled to lecover 
only those attorney fees that would not have 
been incurred but for the application for, and 
issuance of, the preliminary irjunction. Fee8 
that would have been incurred anyway, m the 
course of proving the party's entitlement to 
judgment and refuting the opposing party's de-
fenses, are not recoverable. Tholen v. Sandy 
City. 849 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, d* 
nied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
—Measure of damages. 
The correct measure of damages is the redur-
tion or diminution in the value of the property 
during the period of restraint 3f the value of 
the property did not diminish during that pe-
riod, any measure of damages other than a 
comparison of the fair market value of the 
property before and after the injunction would 
be incorrect. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Noncompliance with rule, 
A temporary restraining order that failed to 
define the injury and state why it was irrepa-
rable, containing instead mere conclusory 
statements, and that failed to list the reasons 
for extending the order, was improperly 
granted. Birch Creek Irrigatior v. Prothero, 
858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions 
§§ 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303, 
310 to 316. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 8,16, 22 to 
24, 36 et seq; 43A C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 165, 
166, 180, 206, 208. 
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, en-
forceability of covenant not tu compete in, 17 
A.L.R.3d 863. 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject 
to, 33 A.L.R,3d 589. 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in 
question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572. 
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver-
sion of water by municipal corporation or pub-
lic utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426. 
Preliminary mandatory injunction to pre-
vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting 
practices, 49 A.L R 3d 1239 
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying 
refusal to honor, or injunction against honor-
ing, letter of ci edit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2), 
25 A.L.R,4th 239. 
Recovery of damages resulting from wrong-
ful issuance of injunction as limited to amount 
of bond, 30 A.L.R,4th 273. 
Right of employee to injunction preventing 
employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480. 
Propriety of federal court injunction against 
suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 83L 
Key Numbers. — Injunction *=» 9 et seq 
143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. 
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The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the courts case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adju-
dicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the 
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presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding in the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it
 l8 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be pei-
mitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hear ings . After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding 
(11) Orders . If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful res t ra ints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has 
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been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement . The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restiamed or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
occurring. 
(3j Contents of the petit ion and at tachments . The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
resiraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of 
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorit ies. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set oat in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to 
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of 
the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent 
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a 
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances re-
quire, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to ap-
pear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An 
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has re-
strained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person 
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the 
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re-
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
18) Alternative service of the hear ing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
ocher process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent m the action 
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(9) Avoidance of service by r e s p o n d e n t If anyone having custody
 0f 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of Lhe hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring Lhp person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law, 
(10) Hear ing or other proceedings. In the event that the court or-
ders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and 
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person hav-
ing custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so The court may nevertheless direct 
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall 
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the 
petition, if enough is stated to impait the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authori ty . 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, 
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who 
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if 
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by an-
other or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against ihe petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 70. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results m a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated: (D^ where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on ihe petition. On the filing oF a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authori ty or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition, A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief, 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
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has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named 
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the 
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the court's review7 shall not extend further than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule 
represents a complete reorganization of the for-
mer rule. This rule also revises parts of the 
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and 
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies gen-
erally to proceedings that are necessitated by 
the absence of another plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the court. After the rule's in-
troductory paragraph, each subsequent para-
graph is intended to deal with a separate type 
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals 
with proceedings involving wrongful imprison-
ment, subparagraph (c) deals with proceedings 
involving other types of wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty; paragraph (d) deals with pro-
ceedings involving the wrongful use of public 
or corporate authority; and paragraph (e) deals 
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of 
judicial authority or the failure to exercise 
such authority. To the extent that the special 
procedures set forth in these paragraphs do not 
cover specific procedural issues that arise dur-
ing a proceeding, the normal rules of civil pro-
cedure will apply. 
This rule effectively eliminates the concept 
of the "writ" from extraordinary relief proce-
dure In the view of the advisory committee, 
the concept was used inconsistently and 
confusingly in the former rule, and there was 
disagreement among judges and lawyers as to 
what it meant in actual practice. The concept 
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing 
order" and "relief that are more descriptive of 
the procedural reality 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph replaces sub-
paragraph (i) of the former rule. It governs pro-
ceedings based on claims of wrongful imprison-
ment, regardless whether the claim relates to 
an original commitment or a commitment for 
violation of probation or parole, but this para-
graph does not govern proceedings based upon 
claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement. Claims relating to the terms or 
conditions of confinement are governed by sub-
Paragraph (c) of the rule. Paragraph (b), as a 
general matter, simplifies the pleading re-
tirements in wrongful imprisonment cases 
a
^d contains three significant changes from 
procedure under the former rule. First, the 
Paragraph requires the presiding judge to as-
S1gn wrongful imprisonment cases "if possible" 
*°
 l
^
e
 judge who issued the commitment order. 
Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss 
frivolous claims before any answer or other re-
sponsive pleading is required. This provision is 
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 
18 U.S.C § 2254. Third, the attorney general 
or county attorney must file a responsive 
pleading only after the court has concluded 
that all or part of the petition is not frivolous 
on its face and has directed the clerk to serve a 
copy of the petition The advisory committee 
adopted the summary procedures set forth in 
paragraph (b) as a means of balancing the re-
quirements of fairness and due process on the 
one hand against the public's interest in the 
efficient adjudication of the enormous volume 
of wrongful imprisonment cases pending in the 
courts. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs all 
petitions claiming that a person has been 
wrongfully restrained of personal liberty other 
than those specifically governed by paragraph 
(b). It replaces paragraph (f) of the former rule. 
Like paragraph (b) of the present rule, para-
graph (c) endeavors to simplify the procedure 
in habeas corpus cases and provides for a 
means of summary dismissal of frivolous 
claims. Thus, if it is apparent to the court that 
the claim is "frivolous on its face", the court 
may issue an order dismissing the claim, which 
terminates the proceeding. Apart from this sig-
nificant change from former practice, para-
graph (c) is patterned after the former rule. 
Paragraphs (d) and (e) replace paragraph (b) 
of the former rule. The committee's general 
purpose in drafting these paragraphs was to 
simplify and clarify the requirements of the 
preexisting paragraph. 
Paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) replaces para-
graph (b)(1) of the former rule. This paragraph 
deals generally with proceedings for the un-
lawful use cf public office or corporate fran-
chises. As a general matter, the attorney gen-
eral may seek relief on grounds enumerated in 
the paragraph. Any other person, including a 
governmental officer or entity not required to 
be represented by the attorney general, may 
also seek relief under paragraph (d) if the per-
son claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully 
held by another or if the attorney general fails 
to file a petition under paragraph (d) after re-
ceiving notice of the person's claim. In allowing 
appropriate governmental entities and officers 
to proceed under this paragraph, the rule elim-
inates a procedural barrier that previously pre-
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vented anyone other than the attorney general 
and "private" persons to seek relief. Although 
the rule removes the procedural barrier, it was 
not intended to modify the substantive rules 
that hmit the authority or standing of any gov-
ernments! entity or officer. Nor was the rule 
intended to modify the constitutional or statu-
tory authority of the attorney general. Since 
paragraph (d) provides only a general outline 
of procedures to be used in such proceedings, 
litigants should look to the other rules of civil 
procedure for guidance on specific questions 
not covered by paragraph (d). In proceedings 
under this paragraph and paragraph (e), par-
ties seeking temporary relief in advance of a 
hearing on the merits should comply with the 
requirements of Rule 65A. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs rela-
tively unusual proceedings in which the nor-
mal rules of appellate procedure are inade-
quate to provide redress for an abuse by a 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercis-
ing judicial or administrative functions. This 
paragraph replaces subparagraph (2), (3) and 
(4) of paragraph (b) of the former rule. Like 
para^ajoh (d), this paragraph allows the court 
wide discretion in the manner in which such 
proceedings are handled. Like the former rule, 
the scope of review under this paragraph is 
limited to determining whether the respondent 
has regularly pursued its authority. 
1992 Revisions. 
These revisions harmonize parallel provi-
sions of the rule and address technical prob-
lems relating to venue and the content of mem-
oranda and orders in habeas corpus and post-
conviction proceedings. 
Paragraph (b). Changes to this paragraph 
affect the venue requirements for one category 
of extraordinary relief petition. The general 
rule established in the paragraph is that peti-
tions governed by paragraph (b) must be com-
menced in the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement 
was issued. Challenges to parole violation pro-
ceedings, however, should be filed in the dis-
trict court in the county in which the petitioner 
is located. 
Paragraph (c). The changes to this para-
graph enlarge the discretion of the court in 
dealing with those petitions for wrongful re-
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Extended parole. 
—Discretion of board. 
Grounds. 
—Certiorari. 
Civil service commission. 
—Challenge to criminal court's jurisdiction. 
—Mandamus. 
straint that the paragraph governs. In dismiss-
ing claims that are frivolous on their face, the 
court is relieved of the responsibility to state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. This 
change harmonizes paragraph (c) with the par-
allel requirements of paragraph (b)(7) of the 
rule. Other changes allow the court more dis-
cretion in ordering a hearing concerning un-
lawful restraints. The remaining changes in 
this paragraph clarify the contents of plead-
ings and memoranda filed with the court. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective September 1, 1991, rewrote the 
rule to such an extent that a detailed descrip-
tion is impracticable. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, 
in Subdivision (b)(2) added the proviso and 
substituted "district court in the county" for 
"court" in the first sentence, added the last 
sentence, and made a stylistic change; in Sub-
division (b)(3) substituted the present para-
graph designations for "(i)" to "(v)"; in Subdivi-
sion (b)(6) substituted "assigned judge" for 
"presiding judge" in the first sentence and 
added the proviso in the second sentence; 
added Subdivision (c)(4) and redesignated the 
following subdivisions accordingly; added the 
second sentence in Subdivision (c)(5); and re-
Wrote Subdivisions (c)(6) and (10). 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
Vule covering the subject matter contained in 
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), FJR.C.R, 
Which applies the federal rules to proceedings 
tor habeas corpus. 
The federal statute governing remedies on 
^notion attacking sentence appears at 28 
IJ.S.C. § 2255. 
Rule 73, cited in Subdivision (d), was re-
pealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure in 1985. For present pro-
Visions regarding bonds on appeal, see U.R. 
App. P. 6. 
Cross-References. — Corporations, Title 
16. 
Extraordinary writs, U.R. App. P. 19 
Habeas corpus proceedings, U.R. App. P. 20. 
Statute of limitations for habeas corpus ac 
t;ion, § 78-12-31.1. 
Statute of limitations for postconviction re-
lief action, § 78-12-31.2. 
DECISIONS 
Statutory duty of agency. 
-—Prohibition. 
Judicial press restrictions. 
Ilabeas corpus. 
-—Availability. 
Conditions of confinement. 
Cruel and unusual punishment. 
Custody of children. 
Denial of procedural due process. 
Addendum J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FRANCES PALACIOS, 
Respondents. 
COURT RULING 
Case Number 950900814 
The petition in this matter was filed on February 7, 1995, and the Respondents filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the Petition on August 16, 1995. On September 22, 1995, the petitioner 
filed a letter dated September 15, 1995. The Court viewed the letter as a Motion for 
Disqualification and subsequently referred the case to Judge Timothy R. Hanson as required 
by Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In a minute entry filed December 5, 
1995, Judge Hanson ruled that "the letter of September 15, 1995, to the extent that it is a 
request for Judge Lewis to disqualify herself, is legally insufficient," and he transferred the 
case back to this Court. Before the Court had an opportunity to rule on the Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss, the petitioner filed three documents: "Appointment of Master," filed 
December 4, 1995; a letter to Judge Hanson, filed December 11, .1995; "Motion for 
Evidentiary Hearing," filed December 18, 1995. The Court has reviewed those letters and 
believes the documents to be substantively a Motion to Reconsider. For the reasons set forth 
below, the petition for extraordinary relief is dismissed. The petitioner's Motion to 
Reconsider is also denied. 
The Coun has considered the petition for extraordinary relief and the Respondents' 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Extraordinary Relief and Memorandum In Support. The Court 
finds that the Petition is premature; the Petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy available through the appellate process; therefore, the petition is frivolous on its face 
Rule 65B(a) clearly states that a person may petition the court for extraordinary relie: 
where no other plain, speedy and adequate relief is available. In his Petition, the Petitioner 
appears to challenge the authority of a Commissioner to issue a search warrant. The Petitio 
was filed in this court before the Petitioner's trial and sentence on the matter in question. 
The Court finds that the Petition is untimely and inappropriate. The Petitioner has an 
adequate remedy of direct appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. 
The petition is dismissed. The Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider is denied. The 
Respondent shall prepare an Order of Dismissal consistent with the Court's Ruling. 
Dated this day of December, 1995. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OT UTAH, 
FRANCES PALACIOS, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 950900814 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court for consideration of 
respondents' motion to dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief and petitioner's motion 
to reconsider. Respondents filed the motion to dismiss on August 16, 1995. On 
September 22, 1995, petitioner filed a letter which the Court viewed as a motion for 
disqualification. The Court referred the matter to the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson for 
review. Judge Hanson ruled that petitioner's letter was legally insufficient to require 
disqualification. Before the Court had an opportunity to rule on respondents' motion tc 
dismiss, petitioner filed three documents, which the Court considered collectively as i 
motion to reconsider. After reviewing the entire file in this matter, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. By information dated July 6, 1993, petitioner was charged witl 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
2. On January 31,1995, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relie 
claiming that Commissioner Frances Paiacios lacked authority to issue the search warrar 
in circuit case number 931008943 (district court case number 931901914). 
3. After a jury trial on August 3-4, 1995, petitioner was convicted z 
charged. 
4. At the time he filed his petition, petitioner had not yet been convict* 
or sentenced. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of C 
Procedure, is appropriate only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate re 
available. 
2 
2. The petition is premature because petitioner has an adequate remedy 
of a direct appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 
1. Respondents' motion to dismiss is granted. 
2. The relief requested in the petition is denied and the petition is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Petitioner's motion to reconsider is denied. 
/ft* 
DATED this y ~a i v of January, 199£^\ 
3 
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Craig Ludwig 
Clerk of the Court 
Division I 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Richard P. Thomas v. State of Utah 
Supreme Court Number 970284 
Dear Mr* Ludwig: 
Richard D. Thomas filed in the Supreme Court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
a Motion to Consolidate Writ of Habeas Corpus with his Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
The Supreme Court is remanding the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus back to the 
district court for disposition. The Court has denied the motion to consolidate. 
Enclosed is a copy of Mr. Thomas's petition for writ of habeas corpus along with the 
Court's remand order. If you have any questions, please call me at 538-1044. 
Sincerely, 
(. /^WL^o 
Susan E. Richards 
Lead Deputy Court Clerk 
Enc. 
Addendum L 
w^^y// Department of Administrative Services 
<
--£!&.y Division of Archives & Records Services 
Michael O. Leavitt 
(lovrrnor 
Raylcne (i. Ireland 
Kxccutive Dirni'tnr 
.Jeffcry O. Johnson 
•Jivisitm i J inr ic r 
State CaDitoi Archives Building 
Salt Lane City. Utah 84114-1021 
Te1 '80D 528-3012 
^ / -SOli 525 2254 
October 23. 1995 
Richard D. Thomas 
Inmate #13260 
Housing Unit SMU Dogwood F-2 
Central Utah Correctional Facility 
POB 550 
Gunnison UT 84634 
Dear Mr. Thomas: 
This is with regard to your recent request for the following: 
"Salt Lake County—City, annexation to Utah Board of Pardons, as a court 
in city municipality. Specifically the Governor's proclamation of voters 
annexing city, county, to Board of Pardons, by 17-2-4, to include the 
Certification of election results of governor, 17-2-3." 
Please be advised that the Board of Pardons is not "annexed" to the city or the county. 
The Utah Code sections you cite are concerned with annexing county to county. Further, the 
Utah Board of Pardons is not a court in any city municipality. 
lathieen Pardee 
Reference Archivist 
Addendum M 
PAULW.BOYDEN 
•VKTTORIAJ PMAOOS 
GARY L WEBSTER 
*AULW SHEFFIELD 
Admtofetrttor 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROUS AGREEMENT 
I, Richard D. Thomas, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State 
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State 
Corrections, according to this Agreement. 
I further agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any 
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the 
laws of the State of Utah, I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any 
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a criiae may result in action by the Board causing 
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over, 
CONDITIONS OF PARCU: 
RELEASE: 
RESIDENCE: 
3. CONDUCT: 
4. REPORT: 
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement. I will 
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing. 
I shall establish a residence of recorxJ and shall reside at such residence 
in fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without 
knowledge of my Parole Agent: and I shall not leave the State of Utah 
without prior written mithorization from my Parole Agent. It is hereby 
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written 
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive extradition, from any 
state in irtiich I may be found, to the State of Utah. 
I shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. 
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth 
~ each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place 
residence, as required#by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insurirc 
pliance with the conditions of parole. 
o 
o 
com  
5 . IMPIXHMENT: 
6 . SEARCH: 
WEAPONS: 
or any other property under my control, without a warrant* any time day or 
night, upon reasonable suspicion^.as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure 
coopliance with the conditions of my parole. 
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in 
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent. 
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my person, residence, vehicle, 
**ie " *^ " 
,**6»«r  **yon n 
:  y  
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any 
explosives, firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 76-10-501, as amended. 
8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can 
reasonably te expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or 
9. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall: 
1. Submit to Random Urinalysis. 
2. Successfully cocplete ISP program. 
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy. 
I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of 
a copy of this Agreement. 
WITNESSED BY: 
TITLE: 
Administrator, Board of Pardons 
this day of , 19 
SIGNED: 
ADDRESS: 
AMENDED 7/26/1988 
Parolee 
MEMBERS [«{ 
DENNIS M. FUCHS V& 
VICTORIA J. RALACIOS \ r 
GARY L. WEBSTER "" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF RICHARD D. THOM\S 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. l5?5ff 
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence 
ving come before the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 
th day of April, 1987, and the applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the 
ght to appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order: 
It is hereby ordered that Richard D. Thomas be paroled from the punishment and sentence 
retofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the Second and Third Judicial District Court in 
d for the County of Davis and Salt Lake for the crime(s) of Aggravated Robbery* 1st degree, 
piration Life top; Aggravated Kidnapping, 1st degree to run Consecutive, Expiration life 
p; Attempted Escape, 3rd degree to Run Consecutive. 
The parole shall not become effective until the 14th day of October, 1986. The applicant 
rees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the parole 
reement. The parole agreement or contract shall be administered by duly authorized agents 
the Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty 
any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or 
fuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prison or is found to be in violation 
any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this 
der of Parole is revoked and becomes null and void. 
Dated this 27th day of April, 1987. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 27th day of April, 
87, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature as 
irainistrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
PAUL W. SHEFFIELD Administrator 
\s 
PAUL W.SHEFFIELD 
Administrator 
